SAGT 2018

The 11th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory

 

Accepted Papers

 
See important deadlines here.
  • Ágnes Cseh and Tamas Fleiner. The complexity of cake cutting with unequal shares
  • Wei Chen, Xiaohan Shan, Xiaoming Sun and Jialin Zhang. Coreness of Cooperative Games with Truncated Submodular Profit Functions
  • Georgios Amanatidis, George Christodoulou, John Fearnley, Evangelos Markakis, Christos-Alexandros Psomas and Eftychia Vakaliou. An Improved Envy-Free Cake Cutting Protocol for Four Agents
  • Christos Kaklamanis, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos and Dimitris Patouchas. On the price of stability of social distance games
  • Antonios Antoniadis and Andrés Cristi. A Near Optimal Mechanism for Energy Aware Scheduling
  • Jing Chen, Bo Li and Yingkai Li. Information Elicitation for Bayesian Auctions
  • Marcin Dziubiński and Jaideep Roy. Hide and Seek Game with Multiple Resources
  • Xujin Chen, Xiaodong Hu and Chenhao Wang. The Equilibrium Existence of a Robust Routing Game under Interval Uncertainty
  • Zhou Chen, Qi Qi, Changjun Wang and Wenwei Wang. What is the Optimal Deferral Number in Waitlist Mechanism
  • Peter McGlaughlin and Jugal Garg. A Truthful Mechanism for Interval Scheduling
  • Jing Chen, Samuel McCauley and Shikha Singh. Efficient Rational Proofs with Strong Utility-Gap Guarantees
  • Anaëlle Wilczynski and Abdallah Saffidine. Constrained Swap Dynamics over a Social Network in Distributed Resource Reallocation
  • Yukun Cheng, Donglei Du and Qiaoming Han. A Hashing Power Allocation Game in Cryptocurrencies
  • Frits Hof, Walter Kern, Sascha Kurz and Daniel Paulusma. Simple Games versus Weighted Voting Games
  • Ankit Chauhan, Pascal Lenzner and Louise Molitor. Schelling Segregation with Strategic Agents
  • Moran Feldman and Rica Gonen. Removal and Threshold Pricing: Truthful Two-sided Markets with Multi-dimensional Participants
  • Zhize Li, Le Zhang, Zhixuan Fang and Jian Li. Optimal Two-Stage Mechanism for Ordinal Peer Assessment
  • Elias Koutsoupias and Philip Lazos. Online trading as a secretary problem
  • Amy Greenwald, Takehiro Oyakawa and Vasilis Syrgkanis. On Revenue-Maximizing Mechanisms assuming Convex Costs

Short Papers

  • Gerardo Berbeglia, Shant Boodaghians and Adrian Vetta. Tight Bounds on the Relative Performances of Pricing Mechanisms in Storable Good Markets
  • Xujin Chen, Xiaodong Hu, Xiaohua Jia, Minming Li, Zhongzheng Tang and Chenhao Wang. Mechanism Design for Two-Opposite-Facility Location Games with Penalties on Distance
  • Ta Duy Nguyen and Yair Zick. Resource Based Cooperative Games: Optimization, Fairness and Stability
  • Manel Ayadi, Nahla Ben Amor and Jérôme Lang. The Communication Burden of Single Transferable Vote, in Practice
  • Gerold Jäger and Frank Drewes. An Optimal Strategy For Static Black-Peg Mastermind With Three Pegs
  • George Christodoulou, Themistoklis Melissourgos and Paul Spirakis. Strategic Contention Resolution in Multiple Channels with Limited Feedback