

Lecture 9 Network Congestions Part1

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Braess' Paradox


Braess' Paradox is a proposed explanation for the situation where an alteration to a road network to improve traffic flow actually has the reverse effect and impedes traffic through it.

As shown below, time function for someone travelling on a route is affected by the volume of traffic (x) on each link.

when the traffic=0.5

1.Original Network


Original Network



Social Consumption at Nash equilibrium(half and half)= $0.25*0.25*2+0.25*1*2=0.625$

2.Add a fast road


Add a speed road



Social Consumption at Nash equilibrium(green line)= $0.5*0.5*2=0.5 < 0.625$. So all runs fast and minimize total cost.

when the traffic=1
 1.Original Network


Original roads



Social Consumption at Nash equilibrium(half and half)= $0.5 \cdot 0.5 \cdot 2 + 0.5 \cdot 1 \cdot 2 = 1.5$

2.Add a fast road

Add a road




Social Consumption at Nash equilibrium(green line)= $1 \cdot 1 \cdot 2 = 2 > 1.5$. Traffic jam is worsen!(called Braess' Paradox)

Nash equilibrium in general cases

1. Original Network (No fast road)

Nash equilibrium: always half and half no matter what the volume of traffic is.

2. Add a fast road as shown below



case 1: when the volume of traffic $T \in (0, 1)$

Nash equilibrium: the whole traffic take the path A-C-D-B

case 2: when the volume of traffic $T \in (1, 2)$

Nash equilibrium: Suppose the traffic on AC is m and the traffic on CD is n , then the traffic on AD, CB, DB respectively are $T - m, m - n, T - m + n$.

When it is an equilibrium, the time to get from A to B on all the possible routes (ACB, ADB and ACDB) are equal, then we have:

$$\begin{aligned} m + 1 &= 1 + T - m + n \\ &= m + T - m + n \end{aligned}$$

we can get $m = 1$ and $n = 2 - T$.

case 3: when the volume of traffic $T \in (2, +\infty)$

Nash equilibrium: half and half on ACD and ADB.

Resolution of Traffic Dilemma

- (Pigouvian Tax)

$f'(f)$: traffic times the first derivative of delay function

- Result:

Nash equilibrium = Social optimum

- Effect

1. total delay minimized

2. no investment but improved revenue

3. individual optimum aligned with social optimum

Issues Involved with Equilibrium

- Social Optimal = outcome maximize the social welfare

Social Welfare: total utility of all players (the sum of individual utilities).

- Nash = outcome of individual rational (selfish) behavior

Nash may be inefficient in terms of social welfare.